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Commitments have been shown to promote cooperation if, on the one hand, they can be sufficiently
enforced, and on the other hand, the cost of arranging them is justified with respect to the benefits of
cooperation. When either of these constraints is not met it leads to the prevalence of commitment
free-riders, such as those who commit only when someone else pays to arrange the commitments. Here, we
show how intention recognition may circumvent such weakness of costly commitments. We describe an
evolutionary model, in the context of the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, showing that if players first predict
the intentions of their co-player and propose a commitment only when they are not confident enough about
their prediction, the chances of reaching mutual cooperation are largely enhanced. We find that an
advantageous synergy between intention recognition and costly commitments depends strongly on the
confidence and accuracy of intention recognition. In general, we observe an intermediate level of confidence
threshold leading to the highest evolutionary advantage, showing that neither unconditional use of
commitment nor intention recognition can perform optimally. Rather, our results show that arranging
commitments is not always desirable, but that they may be also unavoidable depending on the strength of
the dilemma.
S
ince Darwin, the problem of explaining the evolution of cooperative behavior has been actively investigated
in many fields, from Evolutionary Biology, Ecology, to Economics and Social Science. Several mechanisms
responsible for the evolution of cooperation have been proposed, from kin and group selection to direct and
indirect reciprocity, to structured population, and to punishment1–5. Recently, a large body of economic experi-
ments and theoretical studies have shown that high levels of cooperation can be achieved if reliable agreements
can be arranged6–14. Arranging prior commitments, such as through enforceable contracts or pledges8, deposit-
refund scheme11,12 or even emotional or reputation-based commitment devices7,9, provides incentives for others
to cooperate, clarifying the preferences or intentions of others8,15,16. However, in human societies, not all coop-
erative ventures require explicit prior commitments to be made. On the one hand, arranging reliable commit-
ments may be very costly (and take time)15, which can lead to the prevalence of commitment free-riders, and, on
the other hand, others’ intentions might be clarified without using a commitment device. Contracts are a popular
kind of commitment, which play a key role in enforcing cooperation in modern societies. But even then people
occasionally prefer not to rely on using a contract, as are the cases for interactions between relatives or close
friends, or between (or with) trustworthy brands. In such cases, partners’ cooperative behavior can be envisaged
with high confidence. People also do not ask for promise or making threats when partners’ motivations can be
predicted with high confidence, as doing so may lead to negative reactions or an implication of distrust from
them13,17.
Additionally, human beings are experts in mind reading, particularly at discerning what others are perceiving
and intending18. An ability to assess intention in others, which is clearly possessed by humans19,20, has been
demonstrated to play a promoting role for the emergence of cooperation. It enables individuals to assess coop-
erative intention in others in noisy and uncertain environments, and to identify those with an exploitative
intent8,16,21–23. In addition, behavioral experiments show that people do care about and distinguish between real
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intentions and outcomes, and that difference plays a crucial role in
their decision, for instance, whether to cooperate or to defect, and to
reward or to punish21,24–26. Although recognizing an intention cannot
always be done with high enough confidence to make any decision
based on it, an ability to assess intention in others, based on previous
experience and available observations at hand, allows choosing coop-
erative partners even without resorting to commitment devices.
Thus motivated, here we investigate whether a conditional use of
commitment through intention recognition can promote the emer-
gence of cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. In its
simple form, a cooperative act (C) is to pay a cost (c) for its co-player
to receive a benefit (b . c), while a defective act (D) is to spend
nothing and thus provides its co-player with no benefit. In a one-
shot pairwise interaction, for each player it is better to play D, leading
to a zero payoff for both, while both can obtain a higher payoff (b–c)
if they simultaneously choose C. Here, we consider a strategy, which,
at each interaction, attempts first to assess the co-player’s intention
(whether to cooperate or to defect). Only when it is not confident
about what the co-player intends to do in the current interaction,
does it propose to the co-player a commitment deal. A commitment
proposer pays a cost of arrangement (E) to make the commitment
credible, but those who commit but then default have to provide the
co-player with a compensation (d)27. It has been shown11,12,14,27, that
substantial levels of cooperation are achieved if both the cost of
arranging commitment is small enough compared to the cost of
cooperation, and a sufficiently high compensation can be enforced.
However, if either of these two conditions is not satisfied, commit-
ment free-riders can take over and become dominant27. On the one
hand, if the cost of arranging commitment is too large, those who
commit and cooperate only if someone else pays to arrange the
commitment for them are dominant. On the other hand, when the
cost of compensation is too low, for instance due to the difficulty of
enforcing the deal afterwards, those who agree on the commitment
but then default on it dominate the commitment proposers.
We show that a conditional use of commitments, by means of first
assessing intentions of the co-player, can facilitate the commitment
free-riding issue, ameliorating the performance of commitment and
leading to improved cooperation. The key parameter in our model is
a confidence threshold (h), which is utilized to decide when intention
recognition can be relied on (to choose a move), or a commitment
deal needs to be arranged to clarify the co-player’s intention. The
questions we would like to ask here are whether such a conditional
use of commitment can resolve the commitment free-riding issues,
particularly when a strong commitment cannot be arranged.
Furthermore, what is the appropriate confidence threshold, inas-
much the benefit and the cost of commitments and the accuracy of
the intention recognition vary?
Results
We consider here, next to the traditional pure cooperator (C) and
defector (D) strategies, a new strategy which combines intention
recognition and commitment arrangement, denoted by IRCOM. In
an interaction, IRCOM recognizes the intention (to cooperate or to
defect) of its co-player. A confidence level, xg [0, 1], is assigned to
the recognition result. It defines the degree of confidence, in terms of
a probability, that IRCOM predicts the co-player’s intention cor-
rectly. Then, if it is confident enough about the prediction, that is
if x is greater than a given, so-called, confidence threshold, hg [0, 1],
then in the current interaction it cooperates if the recognized inten-
tion of the co-player is to cooperate, and defects otherwise.
When IRCOM is not sufficiently confident about its co-player’s
intention, i.e. x, h, it proposes a commitment to others and subse-
quently cooperates if the opponent accepts the deal. If the deal is not
accepted, then this IRCOM refuses to play the game. We consider
two additional commitment free-riding strategies14,27: (i) The fake
committers (FAKE), who accept a commitment proposal yet defect
when playing the game, presuming that they can exploit the com-
mitment proposers without suffering a severe consequence; and, (ii)
the commitment free-riders (FREE), who defect unless being pro-
posed a commitment, which they then accept and next cooperate in
the PD game. In other words, these players are willing to cooperate
when a commitment is arranged but are not prepared to pay the cost
of setting it up.
However, the prediction being made can be wrong. We assume
that prediction accuracy and confidence are positively correlated28–30.
Namely, the probability of a correct prediction is, y 5 r 3 x, where r
. 0 is dubbed the accuracy-to-confidence ratio. Assuming that the
confidence, x, is uniformly distributed in [0, 1], the payoff matrix for
IRCOM reads
M~ 1{hð ÞM1zhM2, ð1Þ
whereM1 andM2 are the payoff matrices when IRCOM plays with-
out proposing a commitment (i.e. when x. h) and when it does so
(i.e. when x# h), respectively. For details of the computation of the
two matrices see Methods and Supporting Information (SI). Table 1
summarizes the parameters and variables in our model.
Note that if x # h, i.e. IRCOM is not confident enough about its
intention prediction, it behaves the same as a pure commitment
proposer (COMP)27 when interacting with the non-proposing com-
mitment strategies (i.e. C, D, FAKE and FREE). The greater h is, the
more cautious IRCOM is about its intention recognition result,
thereby tending to use commitments more frequently. In an inter-
action between IRCOM and COMP, we consider that COMP always
proposes first and pays the arrangement cost E due to the time delay
and effort IRCOM spends on intention recognition deliberation.
Emergence of conditional commitment and cooperation.We first
study the stationary distribution in a population of the six above
described strategies, namely IRCOM, COMP, C, D, FAKE and
FREE (see Methods). The results show that, for a large range of the
confidence threshold h, IRCOM is dominant, whereas the
population spends most of the time in the homogenous state of
IRCOM, regardless of the initial composition of the population
(Figure 1a). However, when h is low, free-riding strategies become
dominant. That is, when IRCOMdoes not have sufficient confidence
about whether its co-player intends to cooperate or to defect in the
current interaction, it would be better off counting on arranging a
(costly) commitment deal.
Figure 1b shows that the prevalence of IRCOM endures for a wide
range of E and d, as long as an appropriate h is adopted. Interestingly,
in contrast to COMP27, it is not always the case that the frequency of
IRCOM is demolished when E increases (see also Figure S2 in SI).
IRCOM actually becomes more frequent when E is sufficiently high,
but not too high. This is mainly because IRCOM suppresses the
commitment free-riders for a wider range of E, as can be seen from
Figure 1d where we show the transition probabilities and the trans-
ition directions amongst the six strategies. Namely, for a sufficiently
high E (namely, E~2:0), COMP is taken over by the FREE players,
against which IRCOMstill is a viable strategy. However, when E is too
large, IRCOM is again taken over by FREE players (see Figure S4 in
the SI for a larger E). The viability of IRCOM in dealing with com-
mitment free-riders is robust for varying the accuracy-to-confidence
ratio, r, as shown in Figure 1c. Namely, we observe that IRCOM is the
dominant strategy whenever this ratio is sufficiently high, although
the commitment free-riding strategy FREE takes over when r is too
small. That is, whenever intention recognition can be performedwith
a sufficiently high accuracy, as are the case for instance in repeated
games16,23 or when the intention recognition process is facilitated21,26,
IRCOM is amply sufficient at dealing with commitment free-riders.
We now analyze whether and when the conditional use of com-
mitment can actually facilitate the evolution of cooperation. To that
end, wemake a direct comparison in terms of the level of cooperation
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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obtained through commitment strategies in our model, i.e. from
IRCOM and COMP, and such a level in the unconditional commit-
ment model where IRCOM is not included, see Figure 2. The results
show that certain improvement is possible for a wide range of com-
mitment deals, i.e. for varying E and d, see Figure 2a. Interestingly, the
improvement is most significant when the commitment deal is weak,
that is, when it is rather costly to arrange (high E) and/or no suffi-
ciently high compensation can be enforced (low d). It is exactly when
COMP does not perform well, as it is dominated by the commitment
free-riders FREE and FAKE in either condition (i.e. high E or low d),
respectively27. This notable observation is robust for varying r, as can
be seen in Figure 2b: the improvement in terms of cooperation is
positive in general, and increases with r. Furthermore, the improve-
ment is substantial for large E (see for instance cases with E~2 and 4).
In SI, we show that the improvement is also more significant when
the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger (see Figure S1).
We now ask, when should one take more risk, avoiding to arrange
costly commitment? In Figure 3 we address the effect of varying E and
d, as well as varying the accuracy over confidence ratio r. In general,
the higher E and the higher r, the lower confidence level needs to be
attained to rely on intention recognition predictions. That is, as the
PD becomes more beneficial and the intention recognition predic-
tion can be carried out more accurately, a smaller confidence is
exacted to rely on intention recognition, thereby avoiding the cost
of arranging commitment. We also observe that this confidence level
does not significantly depend on d, see Figure 3b.
Discussion
We have shown, within the context of the one-shot Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD), that a conditional use of commitment based on a
subjective confidence in assessing a co-player’s intention can lead to
improved levels of commitment and cooperation. In general, by
avoiding the payment of the cost of arranging commitments when-
ever gaining a sufficient confidence about the co-player’s intention,
an evolutionary advantage can be achieved. Waiting for a too large
confidence may lead to unnecessarily paying the cost, though it can
be avoided. However, doing so when confidence is low allows defec-
tors and commitment free-riders to exploit, leading to the destruc-
tion of cooperation. Our results show that the gained improvement
via the intention recognition capability is more significant when the
PD is less harsh, and as more accurate predictions can be achieved.
Interestingly, such an improvement is most significant when the cost
of arranging commitments is high, thereby overcoming the weaker
cases of using the pure commitment strategy27. Moreover, our ana-
lysis suggests that, as the PD becomes more beneficial and the pre-
diction is more accurate, a smaller confidence is required to enable
one to take the risk involved in avoiding to arrange costly commit-
ments. These results suggest that, although many societies may have
evolved mechanisms to facilitate the making and the enforcement of
prior commitments (e.g. legal contracts)9,15, the cost-efficiency prob-
lem faced when implementing such mechanisms (e.g. law systems)
may be coped with by using more complex cognitive skills such as of
intention recognition (which has been demonstrated to be prevalent
in humans and primates18–20), in order to facilitate further the sus-
tainability of the commitment mechanisms, hence cooperation.
Our results are in line with the work in Ref. 31, where a resource
claiming model is described. In that model, players can choose
whether to engage in a fight for a resource based on their estimation
of the opponents’ capability and the players’ confidence about their
own capacity. It has been shown that overconfidence (which is equi-
valent to the avoidance of arranging costly commitment at a low
confidence threshold in our model) can become evolutionarily stable
when the resource is sufficiently large compared to the cost of fight-
ing, as the players might lose their chance of winning the resource if
not being confident enough even when they have a stronger capacity
than their opponents. Our work differs from this model in that
whenever the players have a low confidence level (about their oppo-
nents’ intention), instead of refusing to play they can make use of the
alternative, but provenly efficient strategy, of arranging prior com-
mitments. As we have shown, this combination of the two strategic
behaviors performs substantially better than the sole intention recog-
nition one.
The key role of intention recognition in the current model is to
allow choosing cooperative partners and avoid reliance on arranging
a costly explicit commitment. In environments where partner selec-
tion is possible—that is, when people can choose with whom they
associate for mutualistic endeavors—then implicit commitments are
evolved, by which people behave as if they had bargained with others
in order to reach an agreement, in accordance with contractualist
moral psychology32,33. Hence, our results suggest that intention
recognition might have been shaped by natural selection to enable
effective partner selection, which in turn drives the evolution of
implicit commitments, thereby avoiding the cost of arranging expli-
cit commitments.
Several behavioral experiments on intention based strategies exist
that are closely related to ourmodel. The experiment in Ref. 26 uses a
sequential PD (in the presence of noise) where the second-moving
player can recognize the first-moving player’s intention, and choose
whether to punish a defecting act. The experiment showed that indi-
viduals tend to use strong punishment against those who are recog-
nized to have a clear intention of defection while no (or weak)
punishment is used against those who defected but the act is recog-
nized to be unintentional. Our work differs from this experimental
setting in that the intention recognition process is done prior to the
interaction (to find out whether it is necessary to arrange prior com-
mitments), while it is posterior in the experiment, i.e. after the move
has been made. Another experiment in Ref. 21 showed that, in the
course if the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, if co-players’ intention
can be observed, it significantly fosters cooperation since uninten-
tional defection caused by noise can be forgiven, as also shown the-
oretically in Ref. 22. Note that both experiments have been designed
so that the intention recognition process is facilitated, thereby guar-
anteeing a high confidence level. In such cases, as shown in the
present work, the synergy of intention recognition and commit-
ments, both aiming at clarifying co-players’ intention, can promote
a high level of cooperation.
Several extensions to the present model can be described. In our
model we have considered a general one-shot interaction scenario,
but we envisage that as more prior experience is incorporated, for
instance by observing direct or indirect past actions of the co-player,
intention recognition can be performed better, thereby leading to
better performance of IRCOM. Indeed, in Refs. 22, 34, in the context
of the repeated PD with implementation noise, Artificial Intelligence
based intention recognition strategies35,36 can more accurately assess
a co-player’s intention whenever more past interactions are taken
Table 1 | Variables and parameters used in the model
Symbols Description
E The cost of arranging a commitment deal
d The compensation cost
c The cost of cooperation in the PD game
b The benefit of cooperation in the PD game
x The degree of confidence in a correct intention prediction
h The confidence threshold to rely on intention recognition
(i.e. if x . h)
r The accuracy-to-confidence ratio
y The accuracy of intention prediction, given the confidence
(y 5 r 3 x)
b The intensity of selection
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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into account. In SI, we consider a more effective IRCOM strategy,
having a more accurate intention recognition capability (see Figure
S3). Our numerical results show that, whenever the intention recog-
nition model is efficient enough, the intention recognition strategy
by itself alone (i.e. IRCOM with h 5 0) performs quite well, com-
plying with the results obtained in Refs. 22, 34, where concrete inten-
tion recognition models are deployed.
Overall, our work indicates that, on the one hand, it is evolutio-
narily advantageous to be able to avoid arranging costly commit-
ments whenever the co-player’s intention can be assessed with
sufficient confidence and accuracy. On the other hand, arranging
prior commitments may be also unavoidable, depending on the
strength of the dilemma, in order to reach a high level of cooperation.
Methods
Our analysis is based on evolutionary game theorymethods for finite populations37,38.
In the context of evolutionary game theory, the individuals’ or agents’ payoff repre-
sents their fitness or social success. The dynamics of strategy change in a population is
governed by social learning, that is, the most successful agents will tend to be imitated
by the others. There are many ways tomodel social learning5,39,40. Adopting one of the
most frequently used ones, we consider the so-called pairwise comparison rule41,
which assumes that an agent A with fitness fA adopts the strategy of another agent B
with fitness fB with probability given by
1
1ze{b fB{fAð Þ
,
where b controls the ‘imitation strength’, i.e., how strongly the agents are basing the
decision to imitate on fitness comparisons. For b 5 0, we obtain the limit of neutral
drift – the imitation decision is random. For large b, imitation becomes increasingly
deterministic.
Figure 1 | (a) Frequency of each strategy as a function of confidence threshold h. In a population of IRCOM, COMP, C, D, FAKE and FREE individuals,
for a sufficiently large h, IRCOM is most frequent in the population. The performance of IRCOM decreases when h is too high. It implies that
IRCOM should not be too cautious about its intention recognition capacity, i.e. not be too careful to always propose commitment instead of believing in
its prediction accuracy; (b) Frequency of IRCOM at the optimal confidence threshold, as a function of the cost of arranging commitment E and the
compensation cost d. Interestingly, in contrast to COMP, it is not always the case that the frequency of IRCOM is smaller for larger E. IRCOM is actually
more frequent when E is sufficiently large. (c) Frequency of each strategy as a function of accuracy to confidence ratio, r, at the optimal confidence
threshold. When intention recognition accuracy is sufficiently high, IRCOM is prevalent, but when it is small, FREE is most abundant. (d) Transitions
probabilities and stationary distributions (h 5 0.28). Note the transitions from COMP to FREE to IRCOM. For clarity, only the transitions that are
larger than neutral are shown (rN 5 1/N denotes the neutral transition probability). Parameters: In panels (a), (c) and (d): d5 4; E~2; In panels (a), (b)
and (d): r 5 1; In all cases, b 5 4; c 5 1; N 5 100; b 5 0.1.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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In the absence of mutations, the end states of evolution are inevitably mono-
morphic: once such a state is reached, imitation cannot produce any change. We thus
further assume that, with a certain mutation probability m . 0 (also dubbed the
exploration rate42), an agent switches randomly to a different strategy without imit-
ating any other agent. The resulting Markov Chain has a stationary distribution,
which characterizes the average time the population spends in each of these mono-
morphic end states. Yet, for arbitrary exploration rates and number of strategies,
stationary distributions are often cumbersome to compute43–45.
Fortunately, in the case of small exploration or mutation rates, analytical
computation of this stationary distribution can conveniently be computed38,43,46,47.
The small exploration rates guarantee that any newly occurred mutant in a
homogeneous population will fixate or become extinct long before the occurrence
of another mutation. Hence, the population will always consist of at most two
strategies in co-presence. This allows one to describe the evolutionary dynamics of
our population in terms of a reduced Markov Chain, whose size is equal the
number of strategies being considered, and each state represents a possible
monomorphic end state of the population associated with a one of the strategies.
The transitions between states are defined by the fixation probabilities of a single
mutant of one strategy in a homogeneous population of individuals adopting
another strategy46.
More precisely, let N be the size of the population. Suppose there are at most two
strategies in the population, say, k agents using strategy A (0# k# N) and (N 2 k)
agents using strategy B. Thus, the (average) payoff of the agent that uses A or uses B
can be written as follows, respectively,
P A kð Þ~ k{1ð ÞpA,Az N{kð ÞpA,BN{1 ,
P B kð Þ~ kpB,Az N{k{1ð ÞpB,BN{1 ,
ð2Þ
where pX,Y stands for the payoff an agent using strategy X obtained in an interaction
with another agent using strategy Y, given by the payoff matrix (9).
Figure 2 | (a) Improvement in cooperation level obtained from IRCOM and COMP compared to the case where there is no IRCOM, as a function of the
cost of arranging commitment E and the compensation cost d. Improvement is achieved for a wide range of E and d. It is most significant when E is
rather high and d is not too large, i.e. the commitment deal is weak (see Figure S1 in SI for the improvement obtained in percentage, and also for other
parameter values). (b) Such improvement as a function of the accuracy-to-confidence ration, r, and for different commitment deals. In general, the
larger r, the more significant improvement is obtained. Furthermore, when r is sufficiently high, larger improvement is obtained when it is costly to
arrange commitments and/or a high compensation is difficult to enforced. Parameters: b 5 4, c 5 1, N 5 100, and b 5 0.1. In panel (a), r 5 1.
Figure 3 | Optimal confidence threshold, (a) as a function of r, for different commitment deals, and (b) as a function of E and d. In general, the higher r
and the larger E, the lower confidence level needs to be attained to rely on intention recognition predictions (i.e. taking higher risk). This confidence
level does not significantly depend on d. We adopt, in both cases, b 5 4, c 5 1, N 5 100, and b 5 0.1. In panel (b), r 5 1.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Now, the probability to change, by 61, the number k of agents using strategy A at
each time step can be written as
T+ kð Þ~N{k
N
k
N
1
1ze+b P A kð Þ{P B kð Þ½ 
: ð3Þ
The fixation probability of a singlemutant with a strategyA in a population of (N2 1)
agents using B is given by38,41,43,46,48
rB,A~
1
1z
PN{1
i~1 P
i
j~1
T{ jð Þ
Tz jð Þ
: ð4Þ
In the limit of neutral selection (b 5 0), T2(j) 5 T1(j) mj. Thus, rB,A 5 1/N. Consi-
dering a set {1, …, q} of different strategies, these fixation probabilities determine a
transitionmatrixM~ Tij
 q
i,j~1, withTij,j?i 5 rji/(q2 1) andTii~1{
Xq
j~1,j=i
Tij ,
of a Markov Chain. The normalized eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 1 of
the transposed of M provides the stationary distribution described above38,43,46,48,
describing the relative time the population spends adopting each of the strategies.
Deriving PayoffMatrix. The one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma can be described with the
following payoff matrix:
C D
C
D
R,R S,T
T,S P,P
 !
:
Once the interaction is established and both players have decided to play C or D (with
or without commitment arrangements), both players receive the same reward R
(penalty P) for mutual cooperation (mutual defection). Unilateral cooperation
provides the sucker’s payoff S for the cooperative player and the temptation to defect
T for the defecting one. The payoff matrix corresponds to the preferences associated
with the Prisoner’s Dilemma when the parameters satisfy the ordering, T. R. P.
S5,49. In themain text, we use theDonor game, a special case of the PD, withT5 b;R5
b 2 c; P 5 0; S 5 2c, where b and c are the benefit and cost of cooperation,
respectively.
When proposing commitment, the average payoff of IRCOM, as the row player,
reads27
COMP C D FAKE FREE
M1~
COMP
C
D
FAKE
FREE
R{E=2 R{E 0 Szd{E R{E
R R S S S
0 T P P P
T{d T P P P
R T P P P
0
BBBBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCCCA
ð5Þ
The probability that IRCOM relies on the intention recognition prediction, and the
prediction was actually correct, can be written as joint probability distribution50
pc~P xwh,yvmin rx,1f gð Þ~
ðz?
h
ðmin rx,1ð Þ
0
dy dx~
r 1{hð Þ 1zhð Þ
2 if rƒ1 or§
1
h
1{ 12r{
rh2
2 otherwise:
(
ð6Þ
Similarly, the probability that IRCOM relies on the intention recognition prediction,
but the prediction was not correct, is
pic~
1{hð Þ 1{ r 1zhð Þ2
h i
if rƒ1 or§ 1h
1
2rz
rh2
2 {h otherwise:
8<
: ð7Þ
Hence, IRCOMcooperation probability when playing with another IRCOMplayer is,
h 1 pc.
The payoff matrix for IRCOM when relying on intention recognition reads
M2~ 1{hð Þ
m11 m12 m13 m14 m15
m21 R S S S
m31 T P P P
m41 T P P P
m51 T P P P
0
BBBBBB@
1
CCCCCCA
, ð8Þ
where
m11~Pu
2z SzTð ÞuvzRv2;
m12~TuzRv;
m15~m14~m13~SuzPv;
m21~SuzRv;
m51~m41~m31~TuzPv;
With u~pic= 1{hð Þ and v~pc= 1{hð Þ:
Finally, the payoff matrix for IRCOM (as a row player) reads
M~ 1{hð ÞM1zhM2: ð9Þ
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